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Use of Motive Evidence in Judicial Review of Rezonings
by Michael Allen Dymersky and Jesse J. Richardson Jr.
Editors'Summary:In this Article, Michael Allen Dymersky and Jesse J Richardson Jr examine the widespread rule ofjudicial review that a court should
not consider evidence of motive in reviewing legislative actions by local government. They evaluate the rule in the context of a rezoning case in Highland
County, Virginia, in which a group ofplaintiffs conclusively established that impropermotive promptedone supervisorto vote infavor ofrezoning the subject
property. The HighlandCounty CircuitCourt invoked the rule againstjudicial
review of motive evidence to foreclose any consideration of the admitted improperpersonalmotives that had inspired thatparticularrezoning. The authors
conclude that the rule againstjudicialreview ofmotive evidence has outlived
its usefulness in the context ofrezoningsand urge a legislativeintervention.
I. Introduction
Courts recognized as early as Fletcher v. Peck' that judicial
inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a
substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of
government. 2 The prevailing rule is that, in passing upon
municipal ordinances that are legislative in character, as distinguished from administrative or ministerial, the courts
cannot inquire into the motives of the local legislative body
any more than they can question the motives of state legislators. 3 Deferring to that rationale almost 60 years ago, the
Supreme Court of Virginia posited that courts "have no
power to inquire into the motives which prompted [a member of the legislature's] action on a purely legislative matter." 4 The court thereby approved the common law dogma
&

Michael Allen Dymersky is a Partner in the law firm of Furey, Doolan
Abell, L.L.P., located in Chevy Chase, Maryland. Jesse J. Richardson Jr. is
an Associate Professor of urban affairs and planning in the College of Architecture and Urban Studies, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Blacksburg, Virginia.
1. 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810).
2. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing conceptual difficulties with analyzing legislator's motives); cf Paris v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. andUrban Dev., 988
F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1993) (one case in which a federal court explicitly
undertook to review the motives of a co-equal legislative body in order to determine whether litigation served as a catalyst to passage of
legislation that mooted a pending claim).
3. Their motives, considered as the moral inducements for their votes,
will vary with the different members of the legislative body. The diverse character of such motives, and the impossibility of penetrating
into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, presumably precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile. Soon Hing v.
Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 711 (1885) (ignoring proof that ordinance
was adopted owing to a feeling of antipathy and hatred prevailing in
the city and county of San Francisco against Chinese immigrants).
4. Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 49 S.E.2d 321, 323 (Va. 1948).

"that evidence aliunde is inadmissible to assail the motives [of even local supervisors that] induced the enactment of a [local zoning] ordinance, for the purpose of determining its validity."'
Recently, in Blue Grass Valley PreservationCoalition v.
The Board of Supervisors ofHighland County, Virginia,6 a
group of plaintiffs conclusively established that improper
motive prompted one supervisor to vote in favor ofrezoning
the subject property.7 The Highland County Circuit Court
invoked the Blankenship rule to foreclose any consideration
of the admitted improper personal motives that had inspired
that particular rezoning. The Highland County Circuit Court
in the Blue Grass Valley case understandably took that statement in Blankenship v. City ofRichmond' to its logical conclusion, and revealed why the rule-and holding of
Blankenship must be legislatively repealed.
This Article examines the widespread rule of judicial review that a court should not consider evidence of motive in
5. Id. at 325 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But
again, Blankenship also holds, without citation to any authority, that
in Virginia "such evidence is admissible to sustain the validity of the
ordinance, and often has decisive force." Id. (citations omitted).
6. The authors represented some of those who appealed to the local
Virginia Circuit Court a rezoning decision made by the Board of Supervisors, the local governing body in Highland County, in a case
styled Blue Grass Valley PreservationCoalitionv. The Boardof Supervisors of Highland County, Virginia, Equity No. CH0300000400 (filed Apr. 8, 2003) [hereinafter zoning appeal or Blue Grass Valley case]. It was tried before the Honorable Thomas H. Wood, Chief
Judge, 25th Judicial Circuit of Virginia, on April 29, 2004. Chief
Judge Wood issued a final Order and Decree on November 3, 2004,
declining to disturb the rezoning decision.
7. The Board of Supervisors on a 2-to-i vote approved an ordinance
rezoning what was then known as the McNulty Farm, making way
for intensive residential development on a steep mountain tract that
had long been designated agricultural and conservation land.
8. 49 S.E.2d 321 (Va. 1948).
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reviewing legislative actions by local government. The rule
is evaluated in the context of a rezoning case in Highland
County, Virginia. The Article concludes that the rule has
outlived its usefulness in the context of rezonings and urges
a legislative intervention.
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H. The Rule: Courts Should Not Consider Legislative Motive

even in the local government setting. However, valid
grounds exist for not applying this rule in the context of a
local government rezoning. First, one may distinguish
between the acts of state legislature and local government. Second, the nature of rezonings raises the question of whether the act is best characterized as legislative or quasi-judicial.

A. Introduction

B. State Legislatures Versus Local Government Bodies

The general rule in the United States,9 adhered to by 37
states, holds that courts may not review legislative motive,

A clear distinction exists between acts of a state legislature
and of a local government body. Local government bodies

9. Believing that comity among governmental organs and the separation of powers support abstention when a coordinate branch of government is involved, 37 states generally adhere to the doctrine that
courts may not review legislative motive even in a municipal setting.
See James v. Todd, 103 So. 2d 19, 28 (Ala. 1958) ("It is of course a
well settled rule that in determining the validity of an enactment, the
judiciary will not inquire into the motives or reasons of the legislature or the members thereof. The judicial department cannot control
legislative discretion, nor inquire into the motives of legislators."
(quoting Morgan County v. Edmonson, 192 So. 274, 276 (Ala.
1939))); Department of Natural Resources v. Tongass Conservation
Soc'y, 931 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Alaska 1997) (approving notion that
"judicial inquiries into the motives of those enacting orrejecting proposed legislation are to be avoided") (citations omitted); Schuster v.
Schuster, 73 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Ariz. 1937) ("if the act was within the
power of the Legislature to adopt, the fact that it was done from
wrong motives would not affect its validity, no matter how much we
and every other good citizen might reprobate the conduct of the individual legislators").

properly inquire"). But see Midwest Inv. Co. v. Chariton, 80 N.W.2d
906, 911 (Iowa 1957) (while "it is well settled that the motives of a
city council in passing an ordinance will not, as a rule, be inquired
into by the courts," the court was willing to "assume, without deciding, the motives of the council in en[acting the] ordinance may be inquired into," but observed there had been adduced "no evidence of
malice or ill will that would entitle plaintiff to injunctive relief'). See
Ash v. Thorp, 68 P. 1067, 1067-68 (Kan. 1902) ("Such facts might
have been made a basis of appeal to the discretion and judgment of
the [ ] legislature, but we cannot inquire into the motives of that
body, nor question the policy or wisdom of its acts."); Taylor v.
Beckham, 56 S.W. 177 (Ky. 1900) (the motives of the legislators
cannot be inquired into by the judiciary); see also Louisville v.
Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., 286 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Ky. 1955) ("it is well
settled that the courts will not inquire into the motives that impel legislative action"); Kel-Kan Inv. Corp. v. Greenwood, 428 So. 2d401,
405 (La. 1983) ("When an ordinance is challenged which is enacted
by virtue of the discretionary power of the municipal legislative
body, the judiciary will not inquire into the motives of the legislators
in determining the reasonableness of the provision"); Town of
Skowhegan v. Heselton, 102 A. 772,773 (Me. 1917) (The law is well
established that "evidence as to the motive of the framers of the law
or the influences under which they are enacted is not admissible for
the purpose of nullifying an ordinance."); see also Dobbs v. Maine
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 50, 419 A.2d 1024, 1029 (Me. 1980) (courts
will not inquire into motives of municipal legislative body nor influences under which it acts, and the same cannot be shown to nullify
ordinance duly passed in legal form and within scope of legislative
body's powers); Sugarloaf Citizens Assoc., Inc. v. Gudis, 573 A.2d
1325, 1335 (Md. 1990) ("there is ordinarily no common law remedy
that permits invalidation of legislative action because of a legislator's improper motivation. Courts usually do not inquire into legislative motivation as a basis for setting aside legislation"); see also
County Council for Montgomery County v. District Land Corp., 337
A.2d 712, 720 (Md. 1975) ("It is well settled that the judicial branch
of government cannot institute an inquiry into the motives of the legislature in the enactment of laws, lest the legislature be subordinated
to the courts."); Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Driver, 647
A.2d 96, 103 (Md. 1994) ("it is well-settled that when the judiciary
reviews a statute or other governmental enactment, either for validity or to determine the legal effect of the enactment in a particular situation, the judiciary is ordinarily not concerned with whatever may
have motivated the legislative body or other governmental actor");
Morgan v. Banas, 122 N.E.2d 369, 371 (Mass. 1954) ("courts cannot, for the purpose of determining the validity of legislation, receive
evidence of the inducements and motives of the legislators in enacting it").

It is equally clear that we cannot inquire into the motives of
the Legislature in passing the act nor into the means by which
they were induced to enact it. The allegation in the complaint
that the passage of the act was obtained in a fraudulent and
surreptitious manner cannot be considered, for we have no
right to inquire into or consider such matters.
Little Rock v. North Little Rock, 79 S.W. 785, 786 (Ark. 1904);
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
532 P.2d 495, 498 (Cal. 1975) (discussing "fundamental, historically enshrined legal principle that precludes any judicially authorized inquiry into the subjective motives or mental processes of legislators").; see also Sunny Slope Water Co. v. Pasadena, 33 P.2d 672
(Cal. 1934) (in passing on the validity of a zoning ordinance, the
court invoked rule that the purpose or motive of city officials in passing an ordinance is irrelevant to any inquiry concerning the reasonableness of the ordinance). Courts are concerned with the existence
or nonexistence of the power of a legislative body to pass a law. The
motives that actuate the legislators, the wisdom or not of the law and
the incidental effects of it, if there is power to enact it, are not matters
with which the judicial branch of the government may properly concern itself. Johnson v. McDonald, 49 P.2d 1017 (Colo. 1935);
Larrabee v. Bell, 10 F.2d 986, 988 (D.C. 1926) ("The court will not
inquire into the motive which prompted the [zoning] commission in
initiating this proceeding"); In re Craig, 20 Haw. 483, 493 (Haw.
1911) ("the motive that prompted the legislature to act is beyond the
reach of the courts"); Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 218 P.2d 695, 699
(Idaho 1950) ("The subject matter of the ordinance, being within the
police power, and properly belonging to the legislative department
of government, the courts will not interfere with the discretion, nor
inquire into the motives or wisdom, of the legislators."); Moore v.
Village of Ashton, 211 P. 1082 (Idaho 1922) (same). Champaign v.
Roseman, 155 N.E.2d 34, 37 (Ill. 1958) ("It is not within our province to examine the motives which prompted the legislative action
[city zoning ordinance] so long as they are not arbitrary."). But see
People ex rel. Burton v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 121 N.E. 574 (Ill.
1918) (stating in dictum that a court will not explore what motivated
a legislature to exercise its discretion in a particular case unless the
effect of an ordinance indicates "such an abuse of that discretion that
it may be said to be no exercise of discretion at all"). See Munn v. Independent Sch. Dist., 176 N.W. 811, 817 (Iowa 1920) ("The enactment of the statute was clearly within the power of the general assembly, and the motives of the legislators and the reasons or arguments leading them to such action are not a matter into which we can

The general rule is well established that courts will not inquire into the motives of legislators where they possess the
power to do the act, and it has been exercised as prescribed by
the organic law. In such case the doctrine is that the legislators are responsible alone to the people who elect them. And
this principle is generally applied to purely legislative acts of
municipal corporations.
People v. Gardner, 106 N.W. 541, 542 (Mich. 1906).
The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute when it
conflicts with the Constitution. It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason and expediency with the
lawmaking power, nor can it consider the motive which in-
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function "legislatively" only occasionally in making local
land use decisions, deriving their limited power from the
spired the passage of a statute in determining the question of
its validity.
Mississippi State Tax Comm'n v. Flora Drug Co., 148 So. 373, 376
(Miss. 1933).
[U]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, courts should
not inquire into the motives of legislators if an adopted ordinance is legislative in character. Furthermore, in determining
whether the exercise of legislative authority by a city council
is within its statutorily granted powers, a reviewing court is
not concerned with motives, purposes, or personal beliefs of
any individual council member.
State ex rel. People for Responsible Omaha Urban Dev. v. Conley,
459 N.W.2d 222, 225 (Neb. 1990) (citations omitted); Stone v. Cray,
200 A. 517, 522 (N.H. 1938) ("The argument that the ordinance was
passed for the sole reason of preventing the defendants from erecting
and operating their proposed structure is not maintainable. The motives of a legislative body are not subject to judicial inquiry in passing on the validity of its action."); see also Piper v. Meredith, 266
A.2d 103, 107 (N.H. 1970) ("Nor are the motives of the legislative
body determinative of the validity of the ordinance."); State v. Graham, 259 P. 623 (N.M. 1927) ("We do not wish to be understood as
suggesting that this court may inquire into the particular motives
which may have induced individual legislators to vote for or against
a proposed measure. We merely illustrate the fallacy of the reasoning."); Carter v. Stanly County, 482 S.E.2d 9, 13 (N.C. Ct. App.
1997) ("We are not empowered to look behind the motives of the
duly elected members of the County Commission, so long as they
act in compliance with the [zoning] law."); State ex rel. City of Bismarck v. District Court, 253 N.W. 744, 748 (N.D. 1934) ("It must
be presumed that the ordinance was enacted from proper motives
until the contrary is established" and acknowledging "the rule is
general, with reference to the enactments of all legislative bodies,
that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the legislators in
passing them.").
We reemphasize, it is well settled in this state that zoning
amendment proceedings call for legislative determinations
and the doctrine of separation of powers protects legislative
process from encroachment by the judicial branch. Not only
do we believe that judicial examination of legislative motive,
conduct, and compromise would work as an unwholesome
influence in a society that cherishes democratic values, but as
our analysis makes clear, the courts are simply without power
to extend judicial review into this forbidden realm. Any restriction of legislative power, legislative process, and legislative discretion of the Board of County Commissioners should
devolve from the General Assembly.
City of Moraine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 1980 Ohio App.
LEXIS 10754 *19 (Ohio App. June 24, 1980); Atchison, T. & S. F.
R. Co. v. State, 113 P. 921, 923 (Okla. 1911) (adopting the "rule everywhere recognized, that no law can be impeached for fraudulent
motives actuating the legislators, nor on account of corrupt influences brought to bear upon them" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Robertson v. City of Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604,
610 (D. Or. 1961) (where it was "conceded that the motives of a legislative municipal zoning authority such as Salem's Council is not
subject to a judicial inquiry in adjudicating the validity of a zoning
ordinance restricting land uses" (citing E.H. Schopler, Annotation,
Motive of Members of MunicipalAuthority Approving or Adopting
Zoning Ordinance or Regulation as Affecting Its Validity, 71
A.L.R.2d 568 (1960))).
There can be little doubt that a valid exercise of legislative
power, whether on the federal or the state level, will not be invalidated because certain legislators may have had invalid
motives when the legislation in question was enacted. Legislators with evil motives can be part of a group that passes
sound legislation, whereas legislators who have been motivated by the purest of intentions have been known to adopt
legislation that has failed to pass constitutional muster.
Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 988-89 (R.I. 1984); Siegl v.
Zoning Bd. of N. Kingston, 67 A.2d 369 (R.I. 1949) (reclassification
from one established zone to another of lower rating held to be an act
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state legislature pursuant to the state constitution. 0 In a revision ofhis seminal treatise, Judge John F. Dillon oflowa, the
progenitor of "Dillon's Rule,"" said:
It is well settled that the judicial branch of the government cannot institute an inquiry into the motives of the
legislative department in the enactment of laws. Such an
inquiry would not only be impracticable in most cases,
but the assumption and exercise of such a power would
result in subordinating the legislature to the courts. In
analogy to this rule it is doubtless true that the courts will
not, in general, inquire into the motives of the council in
passing ordinances. But it would be disastrous, as we
think, to apply the analogy to its full extent. Municipal
bodies, like the directories of private corporations, have
too often shown themselves capable of using their powers fraudulently, for their own advantage or to the injury
of others. We suppose it to be a sound proposition that
their acts, whether in the form of resolutions or ordinances, may be impeached for fraud actually consummated at the instance of the municipality defrauded and
perhaps at the instance of persons injured thereby.12
of legislative discretion, not quasi-judicial); Douglas v. City Council
of Greenville, 75 S.E. 687, 688 (S.C. 1912) (adopting doctrine that
courts "could not inquire into the motives of the board of supervisors
in adopting the ordinance"); Norbeck & Nicholson Co. v. State, 142
N.W. 847, 853 (S.D. 1913) ("we can n[ot] inquire into the motives of
the legislator"); White v. Henry, 285 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tenn. 1955)
(courts cannot inquire into the motives or methods of the local legislative body in rezoning matters); City of Corpus Christi v. Bayfront
Assocs., 814 S.W.2d 98, 105 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("an individual
city council member's mental process, subjective knowledge, or
motive is irrelevant to a legislative act of the city, such as the passage
of an ordinance"); Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 49 S.E.2d 321
(Va. 1948); State v. Harden, 58 S.E. 715,717 (W. Va. 1907) ("Nor is
this court at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislators in
voting for a law or to impeach the law on the ground of fraud or corruption, either at the suit of a private person or the state."); State ex
rel. People's Land & Mfg. Co. v. Holt, 111 N.W. 1106, 1107 (Wis.
1907) ("nor can we inquire into the motives which actuate legislators
in the performance of their functions as such"); see also State ex rel.
Rose v. Superior Court, 81 N.W. 1046, 1054 (Wis. 1900) ("the court
is limited to the question of power, and its inquiry does not extend to
matters of expediency, the motives of the legislators, or the reasons
given for their action"); Territory of Wyoming v. Nelson, 2 Wyo.
346, 365 (Wyo. 1880) ("Of course we have nothing to do with the
motives of the legislature, but as no motives of this kind, or any
other, can cause us to negative and set aside a law.").
10. Under current doctrine, at least in federal courts, the state's police
power is defined by explicit constitutional prohibitions, not by implied limits on the scope of government power. See, e.g., Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239, 14 ELR 20549 (1984)
("Subject to specific constitutional limits, when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive.") (citations omitted). Municipalities, on the other
hand, are limited to certain delegated legitimate purposes-the
quartet of health, safety, morals, and the general welfare-and
when the local governing body's goal is not a legitimate police
power purpose, one would suppose substantive due process would
be violated, even in Virginia Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216
S.E.2d 199, 210 (Va. 1975) (land use restriction not substantially
related to public health, safety, or welfare constitutes denial of
equal protection of laws).
11. See discussion of Dillon's Rule, infra note 17.
12. 2 JOHN F. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs §580, at 914-15
(5th ed. 1911). We note, however, that even the courts in Iowa are
ambivalent. See, e.g., Midwest Inv. Co. v. Chariton, 80 N.W.2d 906
(Iowa 1957) (while "it is well settled that the motives of a city council in passing an ordinance will not, as a rule, be inquired into by the
courts," the court was willing to "assume, without deciding, the motives of the council in enfacting the] ordinance may be inquired
into," but observed there had been adduced "no evidence of malice
or ill will that would entitle plaintiff to injunctive relief").
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Even though that highly respected commentator said the
analogy should not be applied to its fullest extent to municipal corporations when powers are misused, only a scattering
of cases share this aspect of Judge Dillon's view.1 3 And al13. The courts in nine states are inclined to review municipal motives
when reviewing local land use decisions. See Josephson v. Planning
Bd. of Stamford, 199 A.2d 690, 692 (Conn. 1964). The court considered legislative motive and reaffirmed that
the principle that public policy requires that members of . .
public boards cannot be permitted to place themselves in a
position in which personal interest may conflict with public
duty. The evil against which the policy is directed "lies not in
influence improperly exercised but rather in the creation of a
situation tending to weaken public confidence and to undermine the sense of security of individual rights which the property owner must feel assured will always exist in the exercise
of the zoning power. It is the policy of the law to keep the official so far from temptation as to ensure his unselfish devotion
to the public interest."
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In that
state, statute:
forbids a member of a zoning commission or board of appeals
from participating in any matter in which he has apersonal interest in the outcome. A personal interest is either an interest
in the subject matter or a relationship with the parties before
the zoning authority impairing the impartiality expected to
characterize each member of the zoning authority. A personal
interest can take the form of favoritism toward one party or
hostility toward the opposing party; it is a personal bias or
prejudice which imperils the open-mindedness and sense of
fairness which a zoning official in [Connecticut] is required
to possess.
Anderson v. Zoning Comm'n of Norwalk, 253 A.2d 16, 20 (Conn.
1968) (citations omitted). But see Sims v. New London, 738 F. Supp.
638, 645 (D. Conn. 1990) ("allegations concerning the motives of
the Council in beginning the investigation are irrelevant. As the
[United States] Supreme Court has noted, 'in times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such
controversies."' (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378
(1951))). Piekarski v. Smith, 153 A.2d 587, 591 (Del. 1959) (acknowledging that bad faith is:
an exception to the general rule that courts will not inquire
into the motives of or inducements to legislators that may influence them in the passage of acts or resolutions. The exception is that the validity of municipal ordinances or resolutions
may be attacked if fraud or bad faith is proved. This rule is
recognized in Delaware.
(citations omitted)); Fossey v. Dade County, 123 So. 2d 755, 757-58
(Fla. 1960) (distinguishing Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So.
2d 838 (Fla.1959), see infra note 35, by applying a statute to void ordinance based on voting commissioner's personal interest). But see
Coral Gables v. Coral Gables, Inc., 160 So. 476, 478 (Fla. 1935),
which stated that
[i]t is settled that the courts will not inquire into the motives
of the Legislature in enacting laws. And by analogy to this
rule it is very generally held that the courts cannot inquire
into the motives of members of a municipal council for the
purpose of determining the validity of ordinances enacted
by them.
Id. Olley Valley Estates, Inc. v. Fussell, 208 S.E.2d 801, 804 (Ga.
1974) ("Conceding that the difficulty of inquiring into the motives of
municipal legislators may lead courts to follow the general rule of
nonreview, it would appear that in zoning actions policy arguments
urge that the general rule not be applied, and that action involving
self-interested votes be invalidated."); Equicor Dev. Inc. v.
Westfield-Washington Twp. Plan Comm'n, 758 N.E.2d 34, 37 (Ind.
2001) ("an inquiry into the 'motive' . . .may be proper in some circumstances, notably where there is a claimed violation of rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment" of the U.S. Constitution).
But see Medical Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Provisor, 669 N.E.2d 406,
410 (Ind. 1996) (when reviewing legislative actions, the trial court
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though Virginia has otherwise adopted Dillon's Rule,14
there presently is no such distinction applicable to municipalities in Virginia law.
may not admit evidence outside of the administrative record because
the trial court is not allowed to inquire into the motives of the legislator). See Sanderson v. City of Willmar, 162 N.W.2d 494 (Minn.
1968) (zoning amendment which reclassifies land for the purpose
of limiting the value of such land against the possibility of future
condemnation is invalid). But see Oscar P. Gustafson Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 42 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn. 1953). There the court
stated that
[t]he motives of members of a council in the enactment of an
ordinance of a strictly legislative nature cannot be judicially
inquired into for the purpose of affecting the validity of such
ordinance, except as the motive of the council may be disclosed on the face of the particular act in question or by reference to general existing conditions or other legislative acts.
Id. See State ex rel. Quintin v. Edwards, 106 P. 695, 700, 701 (Mont.
1910) (acknowledging that while "rule is general, with reference to
the enactments of all legislative bodies, that the courts cannot inquire
into the motives of the legislators in passing them, except as they
may be disclosed on the face of the Acts, or inferable from their operation," the courts nonetheless "will look to the facts and determine
whether the particular ordinance, or the act of the board or commission, carries out the spirit and intent of the legislation, or tends directly or indirectly to nullify it"); Alper v. State, 603 P.2d 1085, 1088
(Nev. 1979) (so "long as the local zoning authority has acted within
its statutory authority and there is no allegation of improper motive,
its classification of an area as 'commercial' or 'industrial' does not
violate the purposes" of the zoning law); Riggs v. Long Beach
Township, 538 A.2d 808, 810 (N.J. 1988) (allowing proof of improper ulterior motives of municipal officials in passage of local
zoning ordinance to vindicate claim of property owner that ordinance was invalid); see also Aldom v. Roseland, 127 A.2d 190, 193
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) ("A quasi-judicial action of a municipal body is rendered voidable by the voting participation of a
member thereof who is at the time subject to a direct or indirect private interest which is at variance with the impartial performance of
his public duty."); Zell v. Borough of Roseland, 125 A.2d 890 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (the "long maintained" distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial functions of municipal councils
in matters of disqualifying interests was not applicable); DeSena v.
Gulde, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (while motives of legislative body may not be subject of inquiry in determining validity of legislation, there is well-recognized exception to the
rule where motivation is disclosed on face of act, assimilable to
declaration of legislative intent, or as part of legislative proceeding); cf. Homefield Ass'n of Yonkers, N.Y. v. Frank, 75 N.Y.S.2d
384, aff'd without op., 80 N.E.2d 664 (N.Y. 1947) ("The council is
a local legislative body, clothed with the general, delegated power
to enact amendments to the Zone Ordinance. Under such a situation
its motives, promptings, and procedures in making the enactment
are not subject to review by the court."). Another court applied a
statute reflecting:
well and wisely established principle of public policy in
Pennsylvania that a public official may not use his official
power to further his own interests . . . . The reasons for this

must be obvious-a man cannot serve two masters at the
same time, and the public interest must not be jeopardized by
the acts of a public official who has a direct pecuniary or personal or private interest which is or may be in conflict with
the public interest.
Genkinger v. City of New Castle, 84 A.2d 303, 305-06 (Pa. 1951)
(citations omitted). But see Commonwealth v. Keary, 48 A. 472,475
(Pa. 1901) (nor are the motives of the legislators in passing the act
open to judicial consideration).
In a few other states, courts have held out the possibility of change
based upon a judicial calculation of public policy. For example, as
stated by one court:
The courts of this state have not yet held that there is an overriding public policy which requires them to scrutinize purely
legislative action and to set aside resultant ordinances or statutes because of financial or personal interests of members of
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It has been observed that "[t]he basic assumption that policy decisions should be made by legislators responsible
[only] to the people is not entirely applicable" in the case of
local governing bodies. This is because "[c]ity [and county]
legislators are responsible not only to city [or county] residents but to the state" as well." The ability to regulate land
use is part of the police power vested in the state legislature that can be delegated to local governing bodies. If allowed by statute, local governing bodies may further delegate the exercise ofthese powers to subordinate bodies, officers, or employeeS.1 6
the legislative body participating in their enactment....
These facts before us do not present a situation where this
court can say that it is clearly in the public interest for the
court to examine the personal interest, financial interest or
motives of the members of the legislative body of the City in
exercising its legislative function in enacting the amendment
to the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the City.
Coffin v. City of Lee's Summit, 357 S.W.2d211,217 (Mo. Ct. App.
1962).
Courts have also suggested that if sufficient evidence of bad motive were adduced, the ordinance might be invalidated. See Patterson
v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d466, 474 (Utah 2003) (observing that
although complaint alleged "the motive of American Fork City was
to retaliate," the facts "f[ell] short of providing any specific explanation of the source of this malevolence," and "[b]are assertions of differential treatment . . even if true, are insufficient to show a spiteful
effort to 'get' the plaintiff' (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Midwest Inv. Co. v. Chariton, 80 N.W.2d 906,911
(Iowa 1957) (while "it is well settled that the motives of a city council in passing an ordinance will not, as a rule, be inquired into by the
courts," court was willing to "assume, without deciding, the motives
of the council in en[acting the] ordinance may be inquired into," but
observed there had been adduced "no evidence of malice or ill will
that would entitle plaintiff to injunctive relief'). But see Munn v. Independent Sch. Dist., 176 N.W. 811, 817 (Iowa 1920) ("The enactment of the statute was clearly within the power of the general assembly, and the motives of the legislators and the reasons or arguments leading them to such action are not a matter into which we can
properly inquire.").
Other courts have even implied that unspecified legislative motives were considered without actually saying so. See In re Kisiel,
772 A.2d 135, 144 (Vt. 2000) (rationale of majority appears to be
rooted in unspecified suspicions about the town's motives: "For
whatever reasons, the Town is attempting, through Act 250, to undo
its own regulatory decisions, without attempting to reopen them in
the Town processes. The only explanation in the record lies in the
testimony of the chairman of the planning commission."). And in
one state, where the general rule was changed by subsequent court
ruling, the legislature stepped in to alter a decisional rule broadening
judicial review of local legislating by statute. See Fleming v. Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327 (Wash. 1972) (holding that consideration of legislative motive under rubric of appearance of fairness doctrine applied to all hearings which either amended existing zoning codes or
reclassified particular land under the code), overruling Lillions v.
Gibbs, 289 P.2d 203 (Wash. 1955); see also Raynes v. City of
Leavenworth, 821 P.2d 1204 (Wash. 1992) (overruling Fleming v.
Tacoma in part, by applying statute (WASH. REV. CODE §42.36.010)
providing that for purposes of appearance of fairness doctrine, quasi
judicial actions do not include legislative actions adopting, amending, or revising comprehensive plans or adopting areawide zoning
ordinances or amendments of areawide significance).
14. See JESSE J. RICHARDSON

JR. ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
CENTER ON URBAN AND METROPOLITAN POLICY,
HOME RULE
THE ANSWER? CLARIFYING THE INFLUENCE OF DILLON'S RULE ON
GROWTH MANAGEMENT (2003).

IS

15. City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1604
(1965). Moreover, landowners in the locality might not be domiciled
there, and would therefore not have the right to vote in local elections; an obvious cleavage, especially in rural communities, between
the so called "been heres" and the "come heres" reflected in the popular folk song by Chuck Brodsky.
16. Helmick v. Town of Warrenton, 492 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 1997).
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In Virginia, the zoning power has been conferred upon local governments by legislative enactment of the general assembly. Local supervisors' power to regulate land use is
fixed by a detailed enabling statute that allows local governments to zone real property and sets out how they may zone
and rezone it. That delegated local power is limited to what
has been conferred by the legislature expressly or by necessary implication.'" In other words, a locality's legislative authority to control land use through zoning, conditional use
permits," or special variances' 9 stems not from its own inherent police power, but from whatever limited power has
been specifically granted to localities by state law.
Also in Virginia, an ordinance that "regulates or restricts
conduct with respect to .

.

. property .

.

. is purely legisla-

tive."20 As it relates to zoning, it is settled law in Virginia
that legislative acts by local supervisors must bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare to be reasonable. 2' The local zoning power, as limited
by the statutory grant, must also operate in relation to the
use of land and not for the accomplishment of purposes extraneous to that relationship.22 Therefore, it seems clear that
Virginia's legislature intended to restrict the powers of municipal government to effectively accomplish only these
limited purposes.
That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that:
Where the courts are calleduponto review the acts ofofficials, agencies, and boards exercising delegated legislative powers, the inquiry must ordinarily be whether the
official, agency, or board has acted arbitrarily or capri-

17. This rule takes its name from John F. Dillon, a federal circuit judge,
chief justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, and noted law professor,

and is derived from Clarkv. City ofDes Moines, 19 Iowa 199 (1865)
(Dillon, J.). But see Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 (Mass. 1816)
(towns are "creatures of the legislation" and may exercise "only the
powers [I expressly granted to them"). The Virginia Supreme Court
first recognized the rule in Winchester v. Redmond, 25 S.E. 1001
(Va. 1896). Under the so-called Dillon's Rule that prevails in Virginia, local governments possess only those powers specifically delegated to them by state law, or those fairly implied from expressly
granted powers. Dillon's Rule resembles and relates to the ultra vires
doctrine-literally, "beyond the power"-which states that political
subdivisions hold only those powers expressly conferred by charter
or law and no otherpowers. Dillon's Rule is a guideline that Virginia
judges use in interpreting Virginia law that significantly restricts the
authority of local governments in land use regulation and otherwise.
See RICHARDSON JR. ET AL., supra note 16.
18. Helmick v. Town of Warrenton, 492 S.E.2d at 115 ("In so far as the
nature of the power exercised is concerned, we see no difference between granting or denying a special use permit, which we have classified as a legislative act, and consenting to the vacation of a subdivision plat." (citations omitted)). Earlier in Byrum v. BoardofSupervi-

sors of Orange County, 225 S.E.2d 369 (Va. 1976), the Virginia Supreme Court overruled the holding in City of Winchester v. Glover,

97 S.E.2d 661, 663 (Va. 1957), that the grant or denial of a special
use permit by the city council was an administrative act. See Byrum,

225 S.E.2d at 372.
19. A zoning variance is ordinarily considered an administrative function, and the body granting one must make certain findings of factrequired by statute. Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals,

594 S.E.2d 571, 576-77 (Va. 2004). If it does not do so, "the parties
cannot properly litigate, the circuit court cannot properly adjudicate,
and this Court cannot properly review the issues on appeal." Packer

v. Homsby, 267 S.E.2d 140, 142 (Va. 1980). "Those prerequisite
findings are, in variance cases, crucial to the exercise of the power of
judicial review which the General Assembly has vested in the

courts." Ames v. Painter, 389 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Va. 1990).
20. Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 49 S.E.2d 321, 324 (Va. 1948).
21. VA. CODE ANN. §§15.2-2283, 15.2-2200 (Michie 2003).
22. Id. §15.2-2284 (Michie 2003).
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ciously, or rather, whether it has acted in accordance with
the policies and standards specified in the legislative delegation of power.2 3
That is so because it falls to the courts reviewing local ordinances to police the boundaries that have been placed
around legislative action.
As the Virginia Supreme Court observed in Ames v.
24
Painter,
"[t]hat inquiry becomes necessary because delegations of legislative power are valid only if they establish
specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official, agency, or board in the exercise of the power. Delegations of legislative power [that] lack such policies and standards are unconstitutional and void." 25
C. Individual Rezonings: Legislative or Quasi-Judicial?
Most states treat all zoning changes as legislative acts,
whether the change applies to one parcel or many. 26 Because
legislative actions receive a presumption of validity, a challenging party must make out a prima facie case that the action is arbitrary and capricious. 27 The burden then shifts to
the local government to show that the action is fairly debatable. 28 Under this test, it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs
to prevail. 29
Judicial skepticism has led some courts to subject individual rezonings to increased scrutiny, essentially treating
30
the rezonings as more quasi-judicial than legislative.
3
Fasanov. Boardof County Commissioners 1 represents the
strongest statement by a court that individual rezoning actions should not receive the judicial deference accorded legislative acts. In that case, the local government created a
floating zone for mobile home parks. Seven years later, a
landowner applied to have his land so designated. The
county commissioners granted the rezoning and the neighbors objected. The Supreme Court of Oregon found that the
rezoning constituted the application of policy, not the creation ofpolicy. Finding that the action was the exercise ofjudicial authority, the court placed the burden of proof on the
party seeking the change: the county.
Other state courts use the "change or mistake" rule, which
eliminates deference and changes the burden ofproof.32 Under this rule, the local government must show a change in
circumstances or a mistake in the original ordinance to justify the change. Essentially, the courts give deference to the
original ordinance. Other courts subject rezonings to increased scrutiny. 33
23. Ames v. Painter, 389 S.E.2d at 705.
24. 389 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 1990).
25. Id. at 705.
26. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E.
USE PLANNING

ROBERTS, LAND
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW §5.9

(2003).
27. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
28. Id.
29. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 26.
30. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Daniel Tarlock, Shifting the
Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URBAN
LAW. 1 (1992); Robert J. Hopperton, The Presumption of Validity in
American Land Use Law: A Substitute for Analysis, a Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFT. L. REV. 301 (1996).
31. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
32. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 26.
33. Id.
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The skepticism concerning treating local legislative decisions on individual rezonings with deference as legislative
acts arises, at least in part, from doubts about local government legitimacy. First expressed in FederalistPaperNo. 10
by James Madison, the notion seems particularly apropos
when dealing with local government's treatment of individual rezoning requests. 34

III. The Doctrine in Virginia: Blankenship, Blue Grass
Valley, and a Cry for Change
A. Blankenship
The facts of Blankenship are as follows. A local ordinance
changing the classification of an area from a residential to a
business district was passed at the solicitation and for the
personal gain of a sitting member of the municipal council.
This council member was thus able to erect a filling station
in an area in which it would not have been possible prior to
the adoption of the ordinance. Every public official should
perform official duties impartially, uninfluenced by
thoughts ofpersonal gain or loss. As a trustee for the people,
who have a right to require that the official exercise best
judgment in everything that pertains to their welfare, a public official should be unaffected and unprejudiced by anything that might benefit his own interest as an individual.35
Blankenship acknowledges this but does not disturb the
tainted rezoning ordinance, stating that:
where a member of the legislative branch of the government offends in these particulars in performance of a purely legislative duty, he is answerable to the electors from
whom he derived his official position and not to the courts,
which have no power to inquire into the motives [that]
prompted his action on a purely legislative matter.36
Evidentiary rules exist to aid the search for truth, not to
promote a kind of judicial laissez-faire. The Blankenship
rule converts circuit court judges into mere rubber stamps
when land use decisions made by local governments are appealed. 37 However, local government has limited delegated
discretion in making land use decisions. This limited discre34. See JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 837, 853-57 (1983).
35. Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 49 S.E.2d 321, 323 (Va. 1948); cf
Josephson v. Planning Bd. of Stamford, 199 A.2d 690, 692 (Conn.
1964) (reaffirming:
the principle that public policy requires that members of...
public boards cannot be permitted to place themselves in a
position in which personal interest may conflict with public
duty. The evil against which the policy is directed "lies not in
influence improperly exercised but rather in the creation of a
situation tending to weaken public confidence and to undermine the sense of security of individual rights which the
property owner must feel assured will always exist in the exercise of the zoning power. It is the policy of the law to keep
the official so far from temptation as to ensure his unselfish
devotion to the public interest."
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36. Blankenship, 49 S.E.2d at 323.
37. See, e.g., Wolf v. People of State of Colo., 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J.) ("To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal enforcement
may satisfy a longing for certainty but ignores the movements of a
free society. It belittles the scale of the conception of due process.").
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tion fails to justify the deference given to local governments
in rezoning decisions.

C. JudicialTinkering With the Blankenship Rule Has
Been Ineffectual

B. The Blue Grass Valley Case

As it is a judicially promulgated doctrine, one might suppose that courts would have the burden and the duty of
amending the Blankenship rule to reflect social and economic changes. 43 And to some extent, there seems to be a
very limited evolution in Virginia since Blankenship was
decided in 1948.
For example, in 1967, the Virginia Supreme Court in Wilhelm v. Morgan44 specifically authorized judicial inquiry
into "the purpose of a zoning ordinance" in instances where
"illegal spot zoning" is alleged. 45 In the course of doing so,
the Wilhelm court examined a local supervisor's "remarks"
for "an improper motive," acknowledging anomalies in
earlier post-Blankenship cases "involving zoning ordinances that were prompted by improper motives" and that
had been judicially annulled for that reason. 46 Virginia
courts have also begun to accept "extrinsic evidence [that]

It was significant in the Blue Grass Valley zoning appeal that
uncontested evidence before the circuit court proved conclusively that the rezoning of the McNulty Farm had been
allowed merely "because when it came down to it," the
Board of Supervisors' then vice chairman "just didn't like
being threatened" by a lawyer who, on behalf of her client,
had sent a letter stating she would appeal any rezoning decision related to that property on behalf of a local cattleman's
association. That uncontested evidence of spiteful, personal
motivation was in the form of official admissions ofrecord 38
in the Blue Grass Valley case made knowingly, intentionally, and in writing by the county attorney on behalf of her
client, the Board of Supervisors. 39
It cannot be a proper function of a zoning ordinance to
change a prior zoning classification of real property to deter
"threats." 40 The effect of the rezoning proceedings, as a
whole, "has been to annul the [enabling] statute and defeat
the purpose for which it was enacted, by the very body to

4
which has been [e]ntrusted the power to administer it." 1

The circuit court felt constrained by Blankenship to close its
eyes to the obvious and admitted impropriety infecting a supervisor's reasoning:

clearly establishes .

The courts of this state [Missouri] have not yet held that there
is an overriding public policy which requires them to scrutinize purely legislative action and to set aside resultant ordinances or statutes because of financial or personal interests of
members of the legislative body participating in their enactment. . . . These facts before us do not present a situation
where this court can say that it is clearly in the public interest
for the court to examine the personal interest, financial interest or motives of the members of the legislative body of
the City in exercising its legislative function in enacting
the amendment to the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance
of the City.

Board Members are relevant and material, the court
finds that the statements made by [the two supervisors

voting in favor of the enactment] are covered by the rule
inBlankenship and that both instances exhibited the type
42

38. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:11(b) ("Any matter admitted under this Rule
is conclusively established.").
39. The Board of Supervisors admitted for purposes of the litigation
that the supervisor cast the decisive second "vote to rezone the
McNulty farm because when it came down to it, he just didn't like
being threatened." Cf. West Side Women's Servs., Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 573 F. Supp. 504, 523 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (defendant's
response to requests for admission established that regulation was
motivated by hostility). No less authority than common sense
suggests that a three-person Board of Supervisors voting 2-1 to
rezone real property ought properly be deemed to have acted ultra
vires of the enabling statute if it is proved, as it was in the Blue
Grass Valley case, that one member in the majority applied improper reasoning or considered an improper factor. Had that supervisor not voted "yes" to second the motion to rezone the property, and had he not cast the decisive second vote required to pass
the ordinance, the zoning amendment would necessarily have
failed. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 870 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The ordinance passed by
a 5-to-2 vote; thus a switch of two votes could completely change
the attitude of the city council and the municipality in regard to the
issues presented in this litigation.").
40. See DeSena v. Gulde, 24 A.D.2d 165, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (invalidating zoning ordinance passed due to threat); cf VA. CODE
ANN. §§15.2-2283 (identifying appropriate purposes), 15.2-2284
(identifying appropriate considerations) (Michie 2003).
41. State ex rel. Quintin v. Edwards, 106 P. 695, 702 (Mont. 1910).
42. Order and Decree of Nov. 3, 2004 issued by the Honorable Thomas
H. Wood, Chief Judge, 25th Judicial Circuit of Virginia, in the Blue
Grass Valley case, Equity No. CH03000004-00 8, at 3. See supra
note 6. The circuit court did consider the minutes adduced by the
Board to sustain its rezoning action.

. unreasonableness" to rebut the pre-

43. Cf Coffin v. City of Lee's Summit, 357 S.W.2d 211, 217 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1962).

Although the court acknowledges that the motives ofthe

ofpersonal motivation that a Court ought not consider.

.

sumption of legislative validity that attaches to local land
use decisions.4 7
Given these judicial adjustments at the margins of the
doctrine, Blankenship appears to have lost some of its
original force. 48 Nonetheless, Virginia courts have not

Id.
44. 157 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1967).
45. Id. at 923-24; cf Barrick v. Board of Supervisors of Mathews
County, 391 S.E.2d 318, 320 (Va. 1990) ("Legislative purpose" is "a
critical element in the test for illegal spot zoning.").
46. Wilhelm, 157 S.E.2d at 923-24, n.3 (citing Board of Supervisors v.
Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390 (Va. 1959) and Board of County Supervisors
v. Davis, 106 S.E.2d 152, 157 (Va. 1958)).
47. Mountain View Ltd. Partnership v. City of Clifton Forge, 504 S.E.2d
371, 377 (Va. 1998) (quoting Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton, 497
S.E.2d 858, 860 (Va. 1998)); see also Town of Narrows v. ClearView Cable TV, Inc., 315 S.E.2d 835, 839-40 (Va. 1984); National
Linen Serv. v. Norfolk, 83 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Va. 1954).
48. It has been aptly observed: "If the present judicial attitude is that all
acts of a municipal council should be examined for conflict of interest, express disapproval of the distinction wouldbe preferable to verbal preservation but practical extinction." Recent Case, Municipal
Corporations-Judicial
Control-Court Will Review and Invalidate
Municipal Ordinance When Voting Councilman Has Personal Interest in Its Enactment, 75 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1961). The blanket
exclusion of legislative motive appears to be eroding in federal common law as well. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), a
deeply divided Supreme Court upheld a municipality's decision to
close all public pools against a challenge that the municipality closed
the pools in order to avoid having blacks and whites swim together.
The Court held there that a discriminatory motivation does not invalidate a facially neutral law, and thus that the pool closing, which on
its face impacted on whites equally with blacks, did not violate the
blacks' equal protection rights irrespective of the legislature's intent. Id. at 224-25. The next year, perhaps taking a que from Palmer,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, ad-
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been released from the old-fashioned, judge-made, evidentiary shackles that prohibit inquiry into whether the
exercise of legislative discretion vested in a local governmental body has been abused by improperly motivated
municipal decisionmakers.
The exclusionary rule of Blankenship persists to this day
and continues to lurk in judicial precedent as a categorical
impediment to probing personal motivation when land use
decisions are challenged as arbitrary and capricious.

49

That

blanket exclusionary rule continues to be invoked to insulate local public officials from judicial accountability. The
rule continues to apply to even those who flagrantly "exhibited the type of personal motivation that," although found to
be "relevant and material" in the Blue Grass Valley case,50
courts still believe they simply "ought not consider" because of the Blakenship rule.
D. Argument for Legislative Abrogation of Blankenship
1. Courts Should Not Attempt to Distinguish Between
Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Functions of MunicipalLevel Governing Bodies
Because little effort is made to allocate powers at the municipal level, local governing bodies sometimes legislate and
often adjudicate individual rights. The convergence of these
two functions has resulted in a rather vague line drawn between legislative and quasi-judicial (or administrative) activities. A legislative act is generally thought to prescribe a
general rule of conduct. A quasi-judicial or administrative
act is performed when burdens are imposed or privileges
dressed the issue ofjudicial inquiry into legislative motive in Holt v.
City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 931 (1972). There, the plaintiffs challenged an annexation
agreement between the city of Richmond and a neighboring county
claiming that it was motivated by a desire to deny blacks within the
city a racial majority and the opportunity to gain additional representation on city council. The court stated: "when the legislative purpose is not both obvious and constitutionally impermissible, however, the cases uniformly hold that facially constitutional legislation
may not be stricken because of suspect legislative motivation." Id. at
1098. The Supreme Court has never expressly overturned Palmer,
but it has all but done so. Time and again over the past three decades,
for example, the Supreme Court has held that facially neutral laws
may run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if they are enacted or
enforced with a discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n. 11 (1976) ("To the extent that Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition that legislative purposes is
irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our prior cases . . are to the
contrary."); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (invalidating
at-large election system for a rural county's board of commissioners
where shown to have been maintained for the purposes of diluting
the voting strength of blacks).
49. See, e.g., W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 478 S.E.2d 295,
300-01 (Va. 1996) ("We conclude that the trial court properly excluded the proffered evidence of the Board's minutes [because] evidence of the Board's intent or motive in enacting ordinances is irrelevant to our consideration whether they are valid laws."). Yet local
governing bodies routinely adduce minutes of their proceedings in
an effort to sustain their decisions as "fairly debatable," because
Blankenship states, while motive evidence "is inadmissible to assail
the motives which induced the enactment of an ordinance, for the
purpose of determining its validity . . such evidence is admissible to
sustain the validity of the ordinance, and often has decisive force."
Id. at 325 (citations omitted).
50. In considering whether a legislative act is reasonable, however, generally the motives of the governing body in undertaking the act are
deemed immaterial, Ames v. Painter, 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va.
1990), though under Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 49 S.E.2d
321, 324 (Va. 1948), they sometimes are, depending on whether motive is offered to "sustain" or "assail" the validity of the ordinance.
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conferred in a specific case based on a finding that facts exist warranting the application of the general rule. 5
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically noted
that it is not the function ofthe courts to probe the motives of
even quasi-judicial decisionmaking, 52 state courts nevertheless engage in classifying the character ofthe decision made
by the local governing body or municipality to in fact examine decisionmakers' motives. 53
To avoid the rule that the motives of those involved in
legislative action will not be inquired into, it was argued in
Blankenship that although the comprehensive zoning ordinance represented legislative action by the city, a subsequent ordinance passed for the purpose of changing or
amending the original zoning ordinance would be considered quasi-judicial action.54 Rejecting the contention that
'
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51. See Blankenship, 49 S.E.2d at 324 (an ordinance that "regulates or
restricts conduct with respect to . . . property . . . is purely legisla-

tive"); Helmick v. Town of Warrenton, 492 S.E.2d 113, 114 (Va.
1997).
[T]here are no bright-line rules for the determination of
whether an act is administrative or legislative, we have said
that administrative acts generally implement existing laws
while legislative acts create new ones. A legislative act involves the balancing of the consequences of private conduct
against the interests of public welfare, health, and safety.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); City of
Bowie v. County Comm'r for Prince George's County, 267 A.2d
172, 177 (Md. 1970).
The test to determine whether action is legislative or administrative is whether the action is one making new law, i.e., an
enactment of general application prescribing a new plan or
policy, or is one which merely looks to or facilitates the administration, execution or implementation of a law already in
force; in the latter case, inquiry into motive is allowable.
Id.
52. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny, compare Fayerweatherv. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276,306-07 (1904), so
the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected. See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S.
585, 593 (1907). It will bear repeating that although the administrative process has had a different development and
pursues somewhat different ways from those of courts, they
are to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice
and the appropriate independence of each should be respected by the other.
Id.
53. See, e.g., Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 594
S.E.2d 571, 576-77 (Va. 2004) ("Under fundamental constitutional
principles, administrative officials and agencies are empowered to
act only in accordance with standards prescribed by the legislative
branch of government. To hold otherwise would be to substitute the
will of individuals for the rule of law."); Aldom v. Roseland, 127
A.2d 190, 193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (holding in a zoning
context, which would be labeled "legislative" in Virginia, "[a]
quasi-judicial action of a municipal body is rendered voidable by the
voting participation of a member thereof who is at the time subject to
a direct or indirect private interest which is at variance with the impartial performance of his public duty"); Zell v. Borough of
Roseland, 125 A.2d 890 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (the "long
maintained" distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial functions of municipal councils in matters of disqualifying interests was
not applicable).
54. Eleven years after Blankenship this same argument, though ultimately not successful in Florida, at least persuaded one Florida justice. See Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 842-43
(Fla. 1959) (Roberts, J, dissenting) (observing voting municipal official "is not only guilty of a breach of faith in the exercise of the
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers entrusted to him" but:
To give judicial approval to conduct [admitted self and financial interest] so obviously opposed to the traditional stan-
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the adoption of a zoning ordinance is quasi-judicial in character and hence the personal interest of a member of the
adopting body is a proper subject for judicial inquiry, the
Blankenship court offered its view that it would be flagrantly inconsistent to hold that the adoption of a comprehensive zoning law is legislative in character and that the
amendment to such a law is a quasi-judicial act. Yet an important contrary view was announced in the early 1970s by
the Washington Supreme Court in Fleming v. Tacoma.56
In considering a Tacoma city council rezoning of four
parcels of property to allow the construction of a high-rise
condominium, the Washington Supreme Court held that the
"appearance of fairness" doctrine applied to all hearings that
either amended existing zoning codes or reclassified particular land under the zoning code. The court first determined
that the doctrine applied to local legislative bodies as well
as administrative officers. The court then reasoned that
whenever a legislative body decides to alter the status quo, it
adjudicates between the rights of the proponents and the
opponents ofthe change.58 Thus, it implied that if any hearing was held aimed at altering either a zoning code or the
classification for a specific site, the actions were to be considered quasi-judicial, regardless of any other circumstances. 59 The appearance of fairness doctrine has since
been modified by the Wisconsin legislature to exclude certain local land use decisions. 60
Moreover, it has been forcefully argued that courts should
not engage in this artificial distinction between legislative
and quasi-judicial functions of local governing bodies at all
when considering the effect of an improperly motivated local supervisor or council member's vote in a zoning action;
dards of morals and ethics required of ourpublic officials is to
admit a failure in our judicial system; and I, for one am unwilling to concede that an ordinance enacted under such circumstances is beyond the reach of the judicial process ... The
strict disinterestedness that should be required of municipal
councilmen is particularly important in zoning cases, since
this court is committed to the rule that if the zoning determination made by the City Council is "fairly debatable," it
should not be disturbed by a court.)
55. It has been said that "a legislative act generally predetermines what
the rules shall be for the regulation of future cases falling under its
provisions, while an adjudicatory act applies law to determine specific rights based upon specific facts ascertained from evidence adduced at a hearing." Joint Council of Interns & Residents v. Board of
Supervisors, 258 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (noting
that while "the rules of judicial review applicable to administrative
actions are well-defined, the distinction between legislative and
adjudicatory determinations is anything but clear.... At bottom, 'the
distinction between the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial decision
contemplates the function performed rather than the area of performance.'" (citation omitted)).
56. 502 P.2d 327, 331 (Wash. 1972); see also the discussion ofFasano v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), supra note 31.
57. Fleming, 502 P.2d at 331.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See WASH. REV. CODE. §42.36.010 (1982) ("Quasi-judicial actions
do not include the legislative actions adopting, amending, or revising comprehensive, community, or neighborhood plans or other
land use planning documents or the adoption of area-wide zoning
ordinances or the adoption of a zoning amendment that is of areawide significance."). The statute also provides: "No legislative action taken by a local legislative body, its members, or local executive officials shall be invalidated by an application of the appearance of fairness doctrine," thus legislatively overruling Fleming, at
least in part.
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rather the courts should simply invalidate the ordinance in
either case.6
'
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Initially there is the difficulty inherent in classifying the
nature ofthe power exercised by the governmental body.
Secondly, the typical municipal council is composed of
relatively few members whose personal interests are
more easily discovered than might be the self-interests of
members of a larger state or federal legislative body.
Thirdly, like municipal contracts, zoning seems to be
particularly susceptible to self-interested action by
councilmen, and its important effect on the free use and
enjoyment of property justifies closer scrutiny by the
courts. It may be contended that the election process provides a sufficient check on a councilman's self-interested action. But the interested councilman could realize
the benefits of his action before a subsequently elected
council would be able to enact corrective measures, and
such corrective measures might not be effective against
property owners who had relied on the prior action. The
argument often made, that judicial review of a councilman's motives in legislative action would interfere with
a co-ordinate branch of government, seems to call for
only a statement of the conclusion of the court that it will
not review the council's action in this case, since courts
occasionally do review actions of other government
branches. In addition, while this argument should also
apply when the counsel acts in a quasi-judicial capacity,
courts have not hesitated to apply a rule of disqualification for self interest in th[o]se cases [so classified]. Although the courts have generally refrained from stating
that the rule of non-review of motives in legislative action should be abandoned, such a result has in effect been
reached by various techniques which include invalidating action where "fraud" is involved, or classifying an
action as quasi-judicial when in other circumstances it
has been treated as legislative.62
Each of those reasons is as valid today as when first articulated in 1959.63 It seems self-evident when performing either legislative or quasi-judicial functions, that "[u]nder
fundamental constitutional principles," local governing
bodies "are empowered to act only in accordance with standards prescribed by the legislative branch of government.
To [allow] otherwise would be to substitute the will of individuals for the rule of law."

64

2. The Contradiction That Motive Evidence Is Inadmissible
to "Assail" a Local Land Use Ordinance, But Admissible
to "Sustain" It Is Difficult to Reconcile and a Foolish
Inconsistency
The Virginia Supreme Court stated in Blankenship that:
61. See Joel N. Simon, Municipal Corporations-Zoning-Disqualification of Councilman for Personal Interest, 57 MICH. L. REV. 423
(1959) in which it was pointed out that courts should not attempt to
distinguish between legislative and quasi-judicial functions of a
municipal council when considering the effect of motive in a zoning action.
62. Id. at 425-26.
63. Zell v. Borough of Roseland, 125 A.2d 890 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1956) (the "long maintained" distinction between legislative
and quasi-judicial functions of municipal councils in matters of disqualifying interests was not applicable).
64. Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 594 S.E.2d 571,
576-77 (Va. 2004) (so holding only as to "administrative officials
and agencies").
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courts are not concerned with the motives which actuate
members of a legislative body in enacting a law, but
in the results of their action. Bad motives might inspire a law [that] appeared on its face and proved valid
and beneficial, while a bad and invalid law might be,
and sometimes is, passed with good intent and the best
of motives. 6 5
Yet the court also declared that motive "evidence is admissible to sustain the validity of the ordinance, and often
has decisive force." 66 Two relatively recent cases Barrick v. Board of Supervisors of Mathews County67 and
WS. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors County68 i
lustrate quite well the contradictory nature of Blankenship where motive may be admitted "to sustain the validity of the ordinance, and often [with] decisive force," but
may not be considered by a court if employed to attack a
rezoning decision. 69
In 1990, the Virginia Supreme Court asked, "How may
the power ofjudicial review be exercised where the record is
silent with respect to the Board's adherence to a legislatively-prescribed standard?" 70 The answer is, it cannot.
We hold that the "fairly debatable" standard cannot be
established by a silent record. Unless the Board makes
appropriate findings, supported by the record, or states
appropriate conclusions supported by the record, or unless the record itself, taken as a whole, suffices to render
the issue fairly debatable, probative evidence of unreasonableness adduced by a litigant attacking the Board's
action will be deemed unrefuted.7
That same year, in Barrick, the Virginia Supreme Court
undertook an inquiry into whether the challenged board
had "produced sufficient evidence of reasonableness to
make the propriety of the rezonings fairly debatable." 72
Among the evidence the board developed and adduced to
show the reasonableness of its actions and to sustain them,
was "the minutes of the [b]oard meeting at which the
rezonings were adopted." 73

65. Id.; Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 49 S.E.2d 321, 325 (Va.
1948) ("evidence aliunde is inadmissible to assail the motives [of
even local supervisors] which induced the enactment of a [local zoning] ordinance, for the purpose of determining its validity." (citations omitted)).
66. Blankenship, 49 S.E.2d at 325 (citations omitted).
67. 391 S.E.2d 318 (Va. 1990).
68. 478 S.E.2d 295 (Va. 1996).
69. Blankenship, 49 S.E.2d at 325.
70. Ames v. Painter, 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 1990).
71. Id. at 706.
Some or all of the members of the Board, in reaching their individual decisions, may have considered those factors in
good faith, but with the exception of the statements of the
member who moved a denial of the application on those
grounds, there is no basis in the record for an objective conclusion by the reviewing court that the legislative standards
had been given any consideration.
Id.
72. Id.; Barrick v. Boardof Supervisors of Mathews County, 391 S.E.2d
318, 321 (Va. 1990).
73. Barrick, 391 S.E.2d at 321. After reviewing the board's proffered
minutes, the court concluded "the [b]oard produced sufficient evidence to establish that the purpose of rezoning the subject parcels
was not 'solely to serve the interests' of private landowners." Id. at
322.
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Six years later, in WS. Carnes, Inc.,74 the local board filed
a motion in limine in the circuit court seeking to exclude
from evidence all minutes of the board's meetings. The trial
court granted the motion and excluded the minutes; the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling citing
and selectively quoted Blankenship.
Perhaps anticipating Judge Dillon's own misgivings
about "[m]unicipal bodies ...

hav[ing] too often shown

themselves capable of using their powers fraudulently, for
their own advantage or to the injury of others," 5 James
Madison feared the threat of local tyranny, stating:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the
distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the
distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the
number of individuals composing a majority, and the
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the
more easily will they concert and execute their plans
of oppression.76
Today, on judicial review, local governing bodies are vested
with a presumption of reasonableness, 7 7 and held to the
lowest conceivable fairly debatable standard.7' ForBlankenship to have emphasized that motive may always be admitted "to sustain the validity of the ordinance, and often
[with] decisive force," but never to "assail" it, is to move
from a neutral factor to a contradictory one. This is because
on this spectrum, unicameral local governing bodieS 79 are accorded far too much deference to be consonant with notions
of good government.
E. The Virginia GeneralAssembly Should Intervene
State government holds authority over legally subordinate
local governments, and it ought to be alarmed that local supervisors purposefully subvert state-delegated land use prerogatives for blatantly personal reasons. Regardless of the
legislative/quasi-judicial characterization debate prevailing
in the courts, Virginia's legislature could and should correct
its course regarding whether and when the judiciary may inquire into motivations of local "legislators" that inspire their
myriad land use decisions.
There is an urgent legislative duty to abolish the Blankenship rule because the doctrine is demonstrably being misused to protect even those local government officials who
admit for the record, as happened in the Blue Grass Valley
case, that they take forbidden considerations into account when
making land use decisions. These considerations, by their
very nature, are necessarily ultra vires of the enabling stat74. W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 478 S.E.2d 295, 300-01
(Va. 1996). The plaintiffs in that case had offered the local board's
minutes as evidence on the theory that the minutes would provide an
"understanding of the purpose and the intent" of the ordinances they
had challenged. Id.
75.

DILLON,

76.

MADISON,

supra note 12.
supra note 34, at 83.

77. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Southland Corp., 297
S.E.2d 718, 722 (Va. 1982).
78. Fairfax Co. v. Snell Corp., 202 S.E.2d 889 (Va. 1974) (once the burden has shifted to show reasonableness, a governing body has the
burden of showing only that the issue was "fairly debatable").
79. Virginia's localities are obviously unlike federal or state governments with their series of checks and balances, such as bicameral action-the requirement of concurrence by two houses-and the provision of an executive veto.
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ute.s There is no principled reason for judicial deference to
legislative judgments made by local authorities at the local
level that proved to have been motivated by spite, ill-will,
hate, malice, or by any other illicit or malignant purpose.
The public is interested in what motivates the passage of
local land use ordinances and how those laws are shaped.
Citizens are deeply dismayed by what they perceive as persistent abuse by local governing bodies of the state's land
use laws. If improper considerations have been taken into
account by local governing bodies, citizens are increasingly
incredulous that courts would nonetheless approve land use
ordinances produced by those improper motives. Allowing
local supervisors carte blanche to abuse their limited, delegated authority in the manner described in the Blue Grass
Valley case, as Blankenship currently authorizes courts to
do, cannot help but promote a thorough disrespect for the
laws and the legal institutions of the commonwealth.8
80. As the Supreme Court put it in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373-74 (1886):
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. In our context, the Yick Wo standard, to the extent the case articulates one, would require a showing of malice in changing the zoning ordinance.
81. It is ironic that the local government invested by statute with a strict
obligation to protect the public interest in relation to land use decisions, so arrogantly sought to undermine it in the Blue Grass Valley
case, and did so successfully because of the Blankenship
exclusionary rule. Highland County's local government authority is
alleged in pending litigation to have misused its finite legislative
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IV. Conclusion
Blankenship'sasymmetrical exclusionary doctrine in the local land use context is incoherent, disingenuous, intellectually muddled, and morally confused. The dictum that courts
in Virginia should be barred from considering proof (established by judicial admissions of supervisors or otherwise)
that zoning ordinances were infected by improper motives is
a relic of earlier times. Other than perhaps benighted stare
decisis, there is no sound and valid reason today for courts in
Virginia to close their eyes to obvious impropriety animating a local supervisor's reasoning, or to ignore that which is
plainly unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious legislative
action at the local level. The Blankenship rule no longer has
a proper place in our law, and it should be changed by curative legislation.
powers once again, this time in the process of granting a conditional
use permit to allow industrial wind utilities to be erected in the Commonwealth, at the expense of private property rights of neighbors
and all those other than the applicant, and against the wishes of a majority of land owners and their own Highland County constituents.
Highland's Board of Supervisors might possibly have been emboldened by learning of the rule in Virginia thatBlankenshiplong ago established. A newspaper account of the July 14, 2005 decision reports, for instance, that one of two supervisors who voted to approve
the "wind farm" proposal had "implied that he's received threats,
verbal abuse and even 'what I perceive to be a bribe."' Mason Adams, HighlandCo. Oks Wind Farm Project, THE ROANOKE TIMES,
July 15, 2005. It surely is coincidental, but worthy of further note,
that Dillon's Rule, see supra note 17, itself was created to curb widespread municipal corruption related to promotion of the railroad industry, where local governments often disregarded private property
rights in pursuing revenue from railroad facilities, stations, and lines
in an early display of competition for economic development. See
RICHARDSON JR. ET AL., supra note 14, at 7.

